A milestone in the evolution of the US-Japan Alliance

Dr. Patrick M. Cronin is Senior Advisor and Senior Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. He was a Keynote Speaker and panelist for GUASA's 2013 Roundtable, and an organizer and panelist for GUASA's 2014 Roundtable. He is the author of the following article appearing in The National Interest online magazine, and has authored many other articles for that publication. Please read the whole article at the link; excerpts are related below.

A New Type of U.S.-Japan Relations

At 9:30 AM on April 28, 1952 the U.S.-Japan alliance stood up as the U.S. occupation of Japan stood down [4]. At the end of this month, the U.S.-Japan alliance will step up as Japan steps out as a more normal state, capable of both defending itself and others.

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s address to a joint session of Congress on April 29 should go down in history as a day of glory, not of infamy. Some serious critics will remain dissatisfied over perceived historical revisionism. Yet the fact will remain that the biggest antagonists in the Pacific War have forged a prosperous postwar system and a vigorous alliance. When the Prime Minister speaks to a full house of Senators and Representatives, he can be expected to offer humble remorse for the past, quiet pride in Japan’s remarkable seven-decade-long contribution to global order, and a roadmap for how the alliance can perpetuate a rules-based system well into the 21st century.

The latest evolution of the alliance will be encapsulated in new defense guidelines issued on the eve of the oration, which will be delivered in English. To be sure, the guidelines document itself will be unremarkable. Twenty-five pages of prose written by a bureaucratic committee describing allied roles and missions are not meant to be Shakespearean. Those seeking a coherent statement of strategic clarity will also be disappointed. Nonetheless, the guidelines will provide a gateway to an unprecedented degree of alliance capacity, comprehensiveness, and coordination.

In short, the new guidelines will mark a milestone along the path of converting a relationship between a victor and the vanquished into a mature security partnership between the world’s two richest democracies, capable of acting swiftly and in concert to address a full array of contingencies, from humanitarian disaster to war.

Although Japan surrendered to the United States on September 2, 1945, peace between the former foes did not become official until April 28, 1952, when the San Francisco Peace Treaty [6] signed the previous September took effect. This original alliance agreement was necessarily provisional, recognizing that Japan had been disarmed and was therefore incapable of exercising effective right of self-defense.

Eight years alter, the 1960 U.S.-Japan treaty (formally, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America took into account a more equal partnership, albeit one in which the division of labor was complimentary but utterly different (viz., Japanese bases for American defense).

The 1960 treaty is a model of concision and can be summarized in a single paragraph. The allies pledge to uphold the United Nations Charter, to settle international disputes peacefully, and to refrain from “the use of force against the territorial integrity of political independence of any state.” Both vow to strengthen “free institutions” and promote “stability and well-being.” “By means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid [the allies] will maintain and develop…their capacities to resist armed attack.” They will consult regularly “whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.” The treaty’s famous Article V clause stipulates that each “recognizes that an armed attack…in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous…and declares that it would act to meet the common danger….” Finally, U.S. forces would gain access to land, air, and naval bases, the terms of which would be governed by a separate agreement.

The alliance framework has held up all these decades, but periodic guidelines have been drafted to help define the roles and missions of the two allies.

Yet the guidelines are more about enabling operational capability, not strategy. Even so, it is possible to see both continuity and change in the third set of guidelines to be issued at a 2+2 meeting just before the summit meeting between President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Abe in late April.

The main points of continuity are likely to be that the defense of Japan remains at the core of the alliance. Japan under Abe is not looking for conflict but rather grasping for more security in light of a rapidly changing security environment. The United States, for its part, wants to reassure Japan as to its security, as a means to preserving and adapting a stable and prosperous region. In addition, Japan will remain committed to a basically defensive posture as well as its three non-nuclear principles of not possessing, not producing, and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons on its soil.

But while the fundamentals remain unchanged, the scope and depth of the alliance’s operational capacity will enter a new era. A common operational system will be established with new technology backed up by political understanding. The technology involves interoperable and state-of-the-art command, control, communications and computers and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. The political dimension emerges from the lesson of the 1997 guidelines. A bilateral coordination mechanism to deal with a crisis was never enacted in part because of the potentially escalatory signal it might send to other actors such as North Korea.

The new guidelines will make a common operational coordination system part of the daily regimen. This is essential for dealing with the ongoing grey zone challenges around the Senkaku Islands (which the Chinese call the Diaoyu Islands). But the bilateral coordination mechanism is also meant to be allow “seamless” operations whether the alliance if facing another 3/11 disaster, a 9/11-type major terror attack, or military conflict in the East China Sea or over North Korea. That should ease the ability to pivot from a homeland security to a national security crisis to a whole-of-government or even whole-of-society response.

Another crucial change in these guidelines is the provision that will set in motion further growth in cooperation over how to deal with challenges in cyber and outer space. More questions than answers remain in these areas, including what kind of response would be triggered if one ally or the other found its computer networks or satellites under attack. But by underlining the mounting significance of these domains, the allies signal their determination to make defense cooperation in these areas a high priority in the years ahead.

Of course a common strategy and common interests are necessary but insufficient bases for preserving an effective alliance. Alliances also take constant attention to produce value. This is why some have likened alliance management to gardening. The new guidelines mark a sea change in alliance intent and organization, but they will only be as successful as the day-to-day follow through. This includes, in Japan, following through on the critical legal basis for Japan’s proactive policies. At this juncture, by the end of the summer the Diet seems likely to pass the dozen or so pieces of law necessary to put teeth into the Prime Minister’s plan. That will allow Japan the legal right of collective-self defense, at least under specified conditions, as well as more expansive alliance integration—for instance, the right of the Maritime Self Defense Force to conduct joint patrols out to the South China Sea. In the United States, it means not just using the bilateral coordination mechanism to play point defense on territorial disputes, but using it as a basis to catalyze wider and deeper strategic discussion. It also means working to bring new actors to the table of alliance discussions, from coast guard and law enforcement to those with interests and responsibilities in cyber and outer space.

Meanwhile, as we have seen during the previous nearly-two-decade-long periods between previous sets of guidelines, the world and regional security landscape will not stand still. The process of adapting to emerging challenges is a constant imperative. Nonetheless, the ascent and trajectory of the alliance from April 28, 1952 to that of April 28, 2015 is nothing short of astonishing.

China aid to Pacific Island nations

China has become a 'major donor' in the Pacific Islands region

China is on track to overtake Japan as the third largest donor to Pacific Island nations. In some countries, Chinese aid amounts are already rivaling that of traditional partners, as analyst Philippa Brant tells DW. China has also held two main regional meetings (2006 and 2013) in which it announced a range of aid measures to strengthen economic development and diplomatic engagement with the region. Beijing also provides support to key regional organizations, particularly the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. In addition to its bilateral aid program and support for regional organizations, China also provides scholarships for Pacific Islands students and significant human resources training for government officials, according to the Sydney-based institute.

But new data published by the Lowy Institute on March 2, reveal that since 2006 China has provided $1.4 billion in foreign aid to eight Pacific Island countries - the Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Fiji, Niue, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu. China aid researcher Dr Philippa Brant put together data from over 500 sources, including budgets, tender documents and government statements to come up with an interactive map which gives a detailed picture of China's aid to eight Pacific Island countries.

In a DW interview, Dr Brant talks about China's aims in the region, the risks involved in these financial commitments and which countries have profited most from Chinese aid thus far. Dr Philippa Brant is a Research Associate working with the Research Director of the Australia-based Lowy Institute for International Policy.

Many countries in the Pacific Islands region have significant development challenges, ranging from healthcare to infrastructure to climate change. Although countries receive substantial assistance from traditional partners like Australia and New Zealand, there has been a need for further assistance, particularly in the infrastructure sector.

China, like all countries, provides aid for a number of reasons: economic, diplomatic, and political. In the Pacific Islands region, China is hoping that its assistance will help demonstrate that it is a responsible power that supports other developing countries.

Concessional loans have become a dominant feature of China's aid to the Pacific since 2006, accounting for almost 80 percent of the total aid provided. Many of these loans have been used to build infrastructure, such as roads and hospitals. At the second China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum, held in Guangzhou in 2013, China pledged $1 billion in concessional loans (plus another $1 billion in commercial loans from China Development Bank).

Papua New Guinea and Fiji have received the most aid from China since 2006. This makes sense, as they are the two largest economies in the region. However, China has also provided substantial support to smaller countries, like Vanuatu and Samoa.

See Lowy Institutes's A new tool to examine Chinese aid in the Pacific

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China's aid to Pacific nations since 2006 - $2b

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And see: Western powers coming to terms with China in the Pacific 2 March 2015

In the last decade, China's rapid growth has found it eager to spread its influence in a number of regions around the world, including the Pacific. There are economic and security reasons for this, but also, China says, because it wants to help smaller countries. China has recently announced a billion US dollar loan facility available to Pacific Island countries in the next few years.

A conference held this week at the National University of Samoa, 'China and the Pacific: The View from Oceania', sought to counter misperceptions about China's role in the region, particularly its aid programme.

Organised by Victoria University's Contemporary China Research Centre in conjunction with the Centre for Oceania Studies at China's Sun Yat-sen University and Samoa's University, the conference pulled together a wide range of scholars and policy makers including rarely-heard Chinese voices on the issue. China's Ambassador to Samoa, Madame Li Yanduan, says China takes its role as a leading member of the global community seriously.

MADAME LI YANDUAN: It is our belief that common development is good for the interests of China and also the rest of the developing countries, so that's why we think the Pacific Island countries are important and we would like to contribute something to the development of this region.

Pacific island governments are indicating that China is often more responsive to their needs. Paul D'Arcy, from the Australian National University's College of Asia and the Pacific, says at the same time, Island leaders have learnt how to seek out beneficial aid partnerships.

PAUL D'ARCY: What we are now seeing is the nature of Chinese aid, is that we get Chinese entrepreneurs or Chinese companies coming and saying what do you want? Because they have to go sell that then to Chinese state banks and so it's very much more so a partnership at a ground level getting these aid programmes going.

The director of the University of Hawaii's Centre for Pacific Studies, Terence Wesley-Smith, says China's foray into the Pacific is the biggest challenge yet to the influence in the region of the traditional external powers, Australia, New Zealand and the United States.

TERENCE WESLEY-SMITH: It's not a military challenge, it's a challenge to a sort of regime of aid and support that's been developed over many decades and it's a regime of support which comes with an agenda.

Professor Wesley-Smith says for instance Australia's aid to the islands is often tied to conditions around political and governance reform and neo-liberal economic opportunities.

TERENCE WESLEY-SMITH: To this point there's sort of been a monopoly of aid donors who are agreed that these are the conditions and that monopoly has now effectively been broken by the emergency of China as an alternative aid donor which offers support without political conditions and from the islands' perspective, I think most Pacific leaders, at least, welcome this because it offers them new opportunities that they didn't have before -- new trading partners, new possible sources of investment, and possibilities of working with powers other than traditional external powers.

Samoa's Prime Minister Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi says China's aid in the region fills certain gaps.

TUILAEPA SAILELE MALIELEGAOI: The problem of course is that different countries, development partners of the region, have different priorities, and that's why I mention that China comes in as providing supplementary resources available to the region, covering those areas which are not covered in traditional aid donors' programmes.

Professor Liu Hongzhong of the Centre for Oceanian Studies at Peking University says some western countries are not used to seeing China's aid efforts in the region.

LIU HONGZHONG: Of course China has a big population and people will have doubts about the motives and whether they're going to take the lead or change the rules or whatever. So why don't we just take China as another traditional member of the donors. If New Zealand or Australia were going to donate, would anyone have doubts about their motives?

A number of delegates at the Samoa conference were at pains to point out that there is room for a wide range of partners in the Pacific region. Ambassador Li says China is not looking to usurp other donor countries, but to work together.

MADAME LI YANDUAN: We think the diplomatic corp, we think it's quite open and people just exchange the information about the assistance, development, land - something like that.

China is now showing that it is increasingly flexible and learning more about aid delivery by working with other donor countries in the Pacific, such as with Australia on malaria prevention in Papua New Guinea, and with New Zealand on a tripartite water project in the Cook Islands.

Is it "for the people of Asia to ... uphold the security of Asia” ?

Having just hosted and concluded a very successful multilateral discussion in GUASA Roundtable 2 which included several US security experts, on sovereign US soil on Guam, in the heart of the Western Asia Pacific, it was surprising to read that, at a conference in May 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping is quoted as saying, “It is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia, and uphold the security of Asia.”

But, that was just one of many surprising statements made by Elizabeth C. Economy in her article, China’s Imperial President, in the November-December 2014 Foreign Affairs magazine.

It is worth the time clicking the link at the title above and reading the full piece. Here you can find only extracts, a brief teaser or two, which means this post lacks the context and explanations you can only get by reading the whole article.

Chinese President Xi Jinping has articulated a simple but powerful vision: the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. It is a patriotic call to arms, drawing inspiration from the glories of China’s imperial past and the ideals of its socialist present to promote political unity at home and influence abroad. After just two years in office, Xi has advanced himself as a transformative leader, adopting an agenda that proposes to reform, if not revolutionize, political and economic relations not only within China but also with the rest of the world.

If successful, Xi’s reforms could yield a corruption-free, politically cohesive, and economically powerful one-party state with global reach: a Singapore on steroids. But there is no guarantee that the reforms will be as transformative as Xi hopes.

The United States and the rest of the world cannot afford to wait and see how his reforms play out. The United States should be ready to embrace some of Xi’s initiatives as opportunities for international collaboration while treating others as worrisome trends that must be stopped before they are solidified.

In his efforts to promote ideological unity, Xi has labeled ideas from abroad that challenge China’s political system as unpatriotic and even dangerous. Along these lines, Beijing has banned academic research and teaching on seven topics: universal values, civil society, citizens’ rights, freedom of the press, mistakes made by the Communist Party, the privileges of capitalism, and the independence of the judiciary.

The centerpiece of Xi’s political reforms is his effort to restore the moral authority of the Communist Party. He has argued that failing to address the party’s endemic corruption could lead to the demise of not only the party but also the Chinese state.

Xi has infused his economic agenda with the same nationalist -- even xenophobic -- sentiment that permeates his political agenda. His aggressive anticorruption and antimonopoly campaigns have targeted multinational corporations making products that include powdered milk, medical supplies, pharmaceuticals, and auto parts.

Along with new infrastructure, Xi also wants to establish new institutions to support China’s position as a regional and global leader. He has helped create a new development bank, operated by the BRICS countries -- Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa -- to challenge the primacy of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. And he has advanced the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which could enable China to become the leading financer of regional development.

Xi has also promoted new regional security initiatives. In addition to the already existing Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a Chinese-led security institution that includes Russia and four Central Asian states, Xi wants to build a new Asia-Pacific security structure that would exclude the United States. Speaking at a conference in May 2014, Xi underscored the point: “It is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia, and uphold the security of Asia.”

Xi’s nationalist rhetoric and assertive military posture pose a direct challenge to U.S. interests in the region and call for a vigorous response. Washington’s “rebalance,” or “pivot,” to Asia represents more than simply a response to China’s more assertive behavior. It also reflects the United States’ most closely held foreign policy values: freedom of the seas, the air, and space; free trade; the rule of law; and basic human rights. Without a strong pivot, the United States’ role as a regional power will diminish, and Washington will be denied the benefits of deeper engagement with many of the world’s most dynamic economies.

Washington should resist framing its relationship with China as a competition. Treating China as a competitor or foe merely feeds Xi’s anti-Western narrative, undermines those in China pushing for moderation, and does little to advance bilateral cooperation and much to diminish the stature of the United States. Instead, the White House should pay particular attention to the evolution of Xi’s policies, taking advantage of those that could strengthen its relationship with China and pushing back against those that undermine U.S. interests. In the face of uncertainty over China’s future, U.S. policymakers must remain flexible and fleet-footed.

At the 2014 Shangra-La Dialogue in Singapore, Fourth Plenary Session, Masashi Nishihara, President of the Research Institute for Peace and Security in Japan, who was one of the participants in the GUASA Roundtable 2, asked the question of Lieutenant-General Wang Guanzhong, Deputy Chief, General Staff Department, People’s Liberation Army, if President Xi Jinping’s 21 May speech in Shanghai meant to exclude the US from Asian security discussions. The question was skirted.

Conclusion of historic GUASA Roundtable 2

The GUASA Roundtable 2, Asia Pacific Security: Regional Commons, Sovereign Interests, successfully concluded October 17, 2014.

Security analysts from Australia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines (ROP), South Korea (ROK), Taiwan (ROC), Vietnam, and the USA met on Guam in the U.S. Mariana Islands, and discussed with candor their common and individual security perceptions.

The discussions were aided by presentations from US military analysts and planners, as well as by a first hand tour of local military installations with briefings from base commanders.

The historical nature of the Roundtable was uniformly remarked upon. For Vietnam, this was the first ever event of its kind attended by its representative. For Taiwan, gratitude was expressed for being invited, as it was a rare opportunity to participate in discussions of this nature with its neighbors.  For Korean and Japanese interests, the discussions were frank yet friendly, unattended by home country political agenda. 

For all of them, this was the first time US representatives attended such a multinational discussion with Asia Pacific nation experts, hosted by US interests on US soil in Asia.

Many of the experts, even the seasoned ones, noted that this was their first time to visit Guam, and were very much impressed by the facilities and hospitality, which made for productive exchange of views, discussion and understanding. There was universal agreement that Guam, located as it is in the middle of the Western Pacific, provides an ideal and conducive place for discussion between themselves, and with the United States government. They all expressed a keen desire to repeat and expand the experience.

These comments were all the more remarkable for the fact that GUASA was unable to afford payments to any of the participants. The benefit they saw, and realized, in the forum and discussion was professional, not monetary.

GUASA again expresses its great honor and satisfaction to have played host to such an illustrious, hard working and dedicated collection of renowned and rising national experts of the region.

GUASA will post written presentation papers and power point materials as they are made available for public distribution. We hope to present a Final Report of GUASA Roundtable 2 by early in the New Year 2015, and to formally present it to the leaders of the USA in Washington, D.C. soon thereafter.

Other reading:

National security experts attend roundtable session
GUASA roundtable highlights international cooperation

Announcing GUASA Roundtable 2, October 16 and 17, 2014

GUASA proudly announces it is hosting another Roundtable on October 16 and 17, 2014, 

at the Hotel Nikko Guam, Tumon Bay, Guam.

The Theme of this Roundtable is: 
Asia Pacific Security: Regional Commons, Sovereign Interests


Twenty Speakers and Participants are coming from Australia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines (ROP), South Korea (ROK), Taiwan (ROC), Vietnam, and the USA

This marks the first ever holding of a meeting of this caliber and subject matter discussing US and Asian security interests on US soil in Asia.



Useful Links:

See the Program here.

See the Biographies of all Speakers and Participants here.

Register to attend here.

With 20 Speakers and Participants coming from the U.S.A. and around the Pacific, GUASA is especially indebted to our Double Gold Sponsor, UNITED AIRLINES.

See the individual Speakers and Participants below:

Australia:
Hayley Channer
Japan:
Dr. Masashi Nishihara
Vice Adm. (Ret.) Yoji Koda
Tsuneo "Nabe" Watanabe
Tetsuo Kotani
Malaysia:
Capt Martin A. Sebastian, Royal Malaysian Navy (retired)
Philippines:
Professor Renato Cruz de Castro PH D
South Korea:
Dr. Chang Hyung Lee
Dr. Dong-ryul Kim
Taiwan:
Dr. York W. Chen
Vietnam:
Dr. Hoang Anh Tuan
USA:
The Hon. Dr. Patrick M. Cronin
Paul S. Giarra
Wallace "Chip" Gregson
Grant Newsham
Jack Sotherland
Timothy ("Tim") A. Walton
Robert Mihalik
Capt. Glenn A. Shepard
Col. Kristian E. Smith

Other reading:

Think tanks set to discuss security at GUASA roundtable
Guam-US-Asia Security Alliance to hold 2nd round-table conference
Conference focusing on Pacific security

Final Report of the 2013 GUASA Roundtable

The Final Report of the GUASA Roundtable, held September 5-6, 2013 is now available in digital pdf format at this link.

GUASA again thanks Carl Ford, Paul Giarra, and Bob Mihalik for their work in compiling, reporting and editing the report of the discussions and presentations of the conference.

Print copies will be made available as soon as print arrangements and costings are finalized. Please contact GUASA at GuamRoundTable@gmail.com for more information.

HASC upping oversight of rebalance to maintain focus

Congress Plans Series of Asia Pacific Oversight Hearings October 30, 2013

Almost two years after the Obama administration released a new “strategic guidance” that prioritized a shift of diplomatic and military focus to the Asia-Pacific region, Capitol Hill is finally taking notice.

And unlike the crippling partisan gridlock that makes budgets unpassable and recently shut down the federal government, legislators are approaching the issue in a bipartisan fashion. A group of Democratic and Republican members of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) announced on Oct. 29 that the committee is kicking off what they’re calling the “Asia Pacific Oversight Series” to start digging into the White House’s strategic rebalance, and how Congress can provide oversight.

The group of lawmakers said that between now and early 2014 they’ll hold at least five hearings on economic security and partner capacity-building efforts in the region.

“The president wanted to shift to the Pacific, and we have to get out ahead of it” Rep. Buck McKeon, the Republican HASC chairman, told reporters. The top Democrat on the committee, Rep. Adam Smith, cautioned that although China is a major global power and that almost anything the United States does in the region will be viewed through the lens of US/Chinese strategic competition, the effort isn’t all about China.

The committee will focus mainly on providing oversight on the Obama administration’s progress in building partner capacity and supporting allies though joint military training activities. “We want to build as strong an alliance system as we can, and about China, I think we need to view them as a partner as well,” Smith said. We need to work together.” The Republican chairman of the seapower and projection forces subcommittee, Rep. Randy Forbes, added, “the biggest thing for us is presence. If we have presence there” the entire region is more stable.

Forbes was also critical of the rollout of the AirSeaBattle concept, which focuses on naval and air power and which some have misinterpreted as a plan for war with China. “There was a kind of throwing out of that concept but not really an education process about what that meant,” he said.

He also lamented that Washington “is losing its ability to develop long-term strategies,” and that he hopes the HASC will be able to focus the administration’s thinking on how to operate in the Pacific region. Over the long term, “what you have to measure is not just what you think the threats are going to be” but also measure the capabilities that our allies and competitors will have in 10 or 20 years, he said. “And that’s what I think we’re not doing.”

Time For Congress To Rebalance On Asia-Pacific: Reps. Forbes & Hanabusa

Rep. Colleen Hanabusa, a respected Democrat from Hawaii with a strong parochial and strategic interest in the topic, joins Forbes to press the call for more congressional focus on one of the fundamental strategic issues with which our country is grappling.

we believe the time has come for Congress to play a leading role in shifting our attention towards the long-range trends that stand to affect our security interests. Primary among these are the shifting security dynamics that have been occurring across the Asia-Pacific region. More specifically, we feel the rise of Chinese military modernization, and the geostrategic impact this trend stands to have on our friends, allies and trading partners throughout the region, calls for a thorough oversight effort by the House Armed Services Committee.

The Obama Administration acknowledged the need for our government to pay closer attention to the Asia-Pacific two years ago with its stated policy to begin to shift the nation’s attention to the region. However, we feel the Congress has been slow to conduct a ‘rebalance’ of its own. This series aims to stimulate such a process, not only because the Obama Administration has not fully supported its rhetoric with resources, but because we know this policy will only be successful with strong congressional input and support.

At its core, this series will seek to enhance an understanding of Asia-Pacific security issues for both members of Congress and the general public. To be successful, we will rely on government witnesses and some of the best independent thinkers across the country to increase our understanding of the military, economic, and political trends affecting the long-term security outlook in the region.

In addition to education and oversight, we aim to use this series to play a leading role in encouraging the Obama Administration to build a multifaceted strategy for Asia-Pacific. For instance, we recently sent a letter to National Security Advisor Susan Rice urging her to conduct a formal, interagency strategy review for the Asia-Pacific. We believe an Asia-Pacific Strategy Review is required not only so that departments and agencies across the federal government can have the authority to think and act creatively within a robust interagency system, but also to communicate to Congress the breadth of resources that will be required to implement this strategy.

First, we acknowledge that Congress has an important role to play across the spectrum when it comes to policy in the Asia-Pacific, including trade policy, diplomatic outreach, alliance management, and sustaining our defense posture and engagement. But given our position as members of the House Armed Services Committee, we have chosen to focus on the balance of military power and questions related to maintaining stability in the region.

Second, this series is about understanding the broad security dynamics of the region — including everything from our alliances, to maritime disputes, to the impact of the China’s military modernization over the last 15 years – and how our government should look to best posture itself to respond in the years ahead. This is not about pushing any one perspective that China is an enemy or threat to the United States. To the contrary, we believe that while there are elements of the U.S.-China relationship that are competitive, there are also many opportunities for cooperation we should explore.

Amongst a tide of recent political turmoil, we are proud to be able to work together on this effort. Although it is often said, it is worth repeating here: U.S. policy towards Asia-Pacific remains a truly bipartisan effort. We look to extend this positive story as our Nation continues the task of building a durable diplomatic, economic, and security architecture across the Asia-Pacific region.