US ASIA-PACIFIC Maritime Security Strategy 2015

U.S. Outlines Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy DOD

August 21, 2015 — The United States has spelled out its maritime security strategy so that all nations understand the American position, David Shear, the assistant secretary of defense for Asian-Pacific security affairs, said during a Pentagon news conference today.

The U.S. will continue to use diplomacy, multilateral institutions and continued engagement to protect free and open access to maritime Asia, while focusing on safeguarding the freedom of the seas, deterring conflict and coercion, and promoting adherence to international law and standards, Shear said. And he reemphasized previous statements by U.S. officials that the United States takes no position over competing claims for land claims in the South China Sea and the East China Sea.

“DoD is investing a new cutting-edge capability, deploying our finest maritime capabilities forward, and distributing these capabilities more widely across the region,” he said. As Defense Secretary Ash Carter has said, “the United States will continue to fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows, as U.S. forces do all around the world,” Shear said.

“We’re building greater interoperability and developing more integrated operations with our allies and partners.” U.S. officials are leveraging defense diplomacy to build greater transparency, reduce the risk of miscalculation or conflict and promote shared maritime rules of the road, Shear said. The United States is working to strengthen regional security institutions and encourage development of an open and effective security architecture, Shear said.

Pentagon releases Asia-Pacific maritime security strategy ChinaDaily Updated: 2015-08-22

China has long opposed the US of hyping the tensions in the South China Sea and regarded the US government as biased in looking at China's maritime territorial disputes with US allies in order to achieve the US rebalance to Asia strategy.

At the Foreign Ministers' Meeting of the East Asia Summit and ASEAN Regional Forum held early this month in Malaysia, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi emphasized that the situation in the South China Sea is stable on the whole and there is no possibility of major conflicts. He said China objects to any non-constructive words or deeds that attempt to exaggerate the disagreements, hype up confrontation and heat up tensions, which do not conform to reality. Wang noted that China also has a stake in the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, adding that up to now, there has not been a single case in which freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is impeded. "China stands ready to work with other parties to continue to ensure freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea," he said.

The foreign minister said China is a victim on the South China Sea issue, citing the fact how the Philippines illegally occupied a Chinese island there. He said China has exercised utmost restraint in order to uphold peace and stability there. Wang reiterated China position of seeking to peacefully resolve disputes through negotiation and consultation on the basis of respecting historical facts and in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

China announced the completion of land reclamation at the end of June. But it will build facilities mainly for public good purposes, including multi-functional lighthouse, search and rescue facilities for maritime emergencies, meteorological observatory station, maritime scientific and research center, as well as medical and first aid facilities, according to Wang. "China stands ready to open these facilities to other countries upon completion. As the largest littoral state in the South China Sea, China has the capability and obligation to provide regional countries with these much needed public goods at sea," he said.

The document is available here.

Recognizing the growing complexity of the Asia-Pacific maritime domain, this report outlines four lines of effort the Department is employing in order to preserve security in this vital region. First, we are strengthening our military capacity to ensure the United States can successfully deter conflict and coercion and respond decisively when needed. Second, we are working together with our allies and partners from Northeast Asia to the Indian Ocean to build their capacity to address potential challenges in their waters and across the region. Third, we are leveraging military diplomacy to build greater transparency, reduce the risk of miscalculation or conflict, and promote shared maritime rules of the road. Finally, we are working to strengthen regional security institutions and encourage the development of an open and effective regional security architecture. Together with our inter-agency colleagues and regional allies and partners, the Department is focused on ensuring that maritime Asia remains open, free, and secure in the decades ahead.

Among other statements made in the nearly 40 page document are these capriciously organized excerpts:

Maritime Asia is a vital thruway for global commerce, and it will be a critical part of the region’s expected economic growth. The importance of Asia-Pacific sea lanes for global trade cannot be overstated. Eight of the world’s 10 busiest container ports are in the Asia-Pacific region, and almost 30 percent of the world’s maritime trade transits the South China Sea annually, including approximately $1.2 trillion in ship-borne trade bound for the United States. Approximately two-thirds of the world’s oil shipments transit through the Indian Ocean to the Pacific, and in 2014, more than 15 million barrels of oil passed through the Malacca Strait per day.

Freedom of the seas, however, includes more than the mere freedom of commercial vessels to transit through international waterways. While not a defined term under international law, the Department uses “freedom of the seas” to mean all of the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea and airspace, including for military ships and aircraft, recognized under international law. Freedom of the seas is thus also essential to ensure access in the event of a crisis. Conflicts and disasters can threaten U.S. interests and those of our regional allies and partners. The Department of Defense is therefore committed to ensuring free and open maritime access to protect the stable economic order that has served all Asia-Pacific nations so well for so long, and to maintain the ability of U.S. forces to respond as needed.

The Department is enhancing U.S. capabilities to project power from the sea, in the air, and under the water. In addition to enhancing our power projection capabilities, the Department is investing in flexible capabilities that will allow us to respond more rapidly and effectively to a wider range of potential maritime challenges. Finally, the Department of Defense is investing in critical enabling capabilities, including persistent, deep-look ISR platforms that will provide us with greater situational awareness and early warning of potential crises in the maritime domain. Over the longer-term, the Department of Defense is also developing a suite of innovative ideas and capabilities – known as the third offset – to advance U.S. military dominance in the 21st century and ensure the United States can deter adversaries and prevail in conflict, including in maritime Asia. To offset advances in anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) weapons that we see proliferating in maritime Asia and beyond, the Department will identify, develop, and field breakthroughs in cutting-edge technologies and systems – especially in the fields of robotics, autonomous systems, miniaturization, big data, and additive manufacturing, and will draw these together in innovative operational and organizational constructs to ensure freedom of access for United States’ forces in a contested A2/AD
environment.

Enhancing our forward presence also involves using existing assets in new ways, across the entire region, with an emphasis on operational flexibility and maximizing the value of U.S. assets despite the tyranny of distance. The cornerstone of our forward presence will continue to be our presence in Japan, where the United States maintains approximately 50,000 military personnel, including the U.S. Navy Seventh Fleet and the only forward-stationed Carrier Strike Group in the world, as well as U.S. Marine Corps III Marine Expeditionary Force and significant Air Force assets. Through the bilateral Force Posture Agreement (FPA) with Australia and the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the Philippines, the Department will be able to increase our routine and persistent rotational presence in Southeast Asia for expanded training with regional partners.

DoD is also modernizing our maritime presence in Guam, as part of our efforts to develop Guam into a strategic hub for our joint military presence in the region. This includes forward-stationing a fourth attack submarine to Guam this year and deploying the Joint High Speed Vessel by 2018, while making investments in the resilience of the infrastructure supporting these capabilities. Guam is the regional hub for Air Force’s Global Hawk fleet and the Navy will operate the MQ-4C Triton unmanned aerial reconnaissance vehicle from Andersen Air Base by 2017. The Air Force continues a program to modernize hangars and other support structures to augment those and other U.S. military capabilities.

U.S. Pacific Command maintains a robust shaping presence in and around the South China Sea, with activities ranging from training and exercises with allies and partners to port calls to Freedom of Navigation Operations and other routine operations. They are central to our efforts. The Department is also pursuing a robust slate of training exercises and engagements with our allies and partners that will allow us to explore new areas of practical bilateral and multilateral maritime security cooperation, build the necessary interoperability to execute multilateral operations, and promote regional trust and transparency. We are increasing the size, frequency, and sophistication of our regional exercise program, with a particular focus on developing new exercises with Southeast Asian partners and expanding our multilateral exercise program.As part of this program, the Department will develop new training ranges in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands to enhance the readiness of our forward forces to respond to regional crises. The footprint associated with this laydown will support the arrival of next-generation capabilities and joint training and readiness in the USPACOM AOR.

In Northeast Asia, the Department conducts several regular maritime exercises with Japan and South Korea focusing on enhancing our combined capabilities. In Southeast Asia, the Department is honing an already robust bilateral exercise program with our treaty ally, the Republic of the Philippines, to assist it with establishing a minimum credible defense more effectively. We are also expanding our maritime engagements with partners like Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam. DoD is working closely with partners in the Asia-Pacific region to encourage greater information sharing and the establishment of a regional maritime domain awareness network that could provide a common operating picture and real-time dissemination of data. Singapore has been a leading partner in this effort. The Department is particularly focused on helping our partners enhance their maritime domain awareness and establish a common maritime operating picture that would facilitate more timely and effective regional responses to maritime challenges.

In South Asia, the Department sees a strategic convergence between India’s “Act East” policy and the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, and we are seeking to reinforce India’s maritime capabilities as a net provider of security in the Indian Ocean region and beyond. Given our broad shared interests in maritime security, the Department has developed a three-pronged approach to maritime cooperation with India: maintaining a shared vision on maritime security issues; upgrading the bilateral maritime security partnership; and collaborating to both build regional partner capacity and improve regional maritime domain awareness.

In addition to building maritime capabilities of allies and partners to deter and address regional threats, the Department is actively seeking to mitigate risk in maritime Asia. The Department is pursuing a two-pronged approach to achieve this objective, one focusing on our bilateral relationship with China, and the other addressing region-wide risk reduction measures. The combination of these two approaches will reduce the likelihood of miscalculation and conflict, which would have a detrimental effect on the United States and the region.

Reaching agreement on bilateral risk reduction measures with China is necessary, but not sufficient. The Department is also focused in the near term on encouraging the development of practical risk reduction and confidence-building mechanisms across the entire Asia-Pacific maritime domain. The U.S. Government urges States to not implement unilateral actions that undermine regional stability and trust. ASEAN is an increasingly important DoD partner, and the Department is working to bolster its engagement with and support of ASEAN’s efforts to promote peace, stability, and prosperity in the region. DoD actively supports the ADMM-Plus Experts Working Group (EWG) on Maritime Security, which seeks to facilitate information sharing, establish best practices, and build standard maritime operating procedures among participating nations in order to reinforce norms of behavior and reduce the risk of conflict. We are also leveraging informal opportunities to strengthen regional cooperation, such as the first U.S.-ASEAN Defense Forum then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel hosted in Hawaii in April 2014. This dialogue provided an informal opportunity for candid discussion with our ASEAN counterparts about shared challenges in the maritime domain and the need for greater information sharing among ASEAN States.

Finally, the Department fully supports countries pursuing multilateral agreements and arrangements to enhance security in maritime Asia. From the Indian Ocean to Northeast Asia, we are
strengthening our military capability to promote stability and respond decisively to threats; enabling our network of allies and partners to address challenges in the maritime areas of the region; leveraging military diplomacy to promote trust, stability, and standards of behavior; and bolstering the ability of regional organizations to address shared maritime security concerns.

Announcing Final Report of the April 16, 2015 Briefing

Following release and announcement here of the videos of the April 16 Briefing, “The US Rebalance to Asia: A Status Report”, GUASA is now pleased to report its release of the Final Report of that Briefing. You can view and download the Report here.

Thanks for the dedicated efforts of Bob Mihalik in getting this report done, and for the critical support and organization of the Center for a New American Security ("CNAS"), who made the event so successful.

 Sen. John McCain - Arizona, and GUASA members

 

Sen. Lisa Murkowski - Alaska, and GUASA members

 Sen. Dan Sullivan - Alaska, and GUASA members and supporters

Amphibious training draws multilateral cooperation

The following are excerpts of the article cited. Please click the link to view the entire articles.

24 nations to take part in Marine Corps Forces Pacific's 'Amphibious Leaders' symposium

Marine Corps Forces Pacific is hosting 23 foreign nations at the inaugural U.S. Pacific Command Amphibious Leaders Symposium May 17 to 21 in Hawaii. Senior military leaders of allied and partner nations are expected to attend.

Australia, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Columbia, France, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Maldives, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Tonga, United Kingdom and Vietnam will be sending representatives, the Marines said. India, Brazil and East Timor were invited but not able to attend.

Growing Indo-Asia-Pacific economics and rising tensions have placed the littorals, where a majority of shipping and commerce operates, at the center of the bullseye for the U.S. military pivot to the Pacific.

“We have thousands and thousands of miles of coastline, thousands and thousands of islands, interposing water between it, and everybody who wants to use that water as maneuver space,” said Brig. Gen. C. J. Mahoney, deputy commander of Marine Corps Forces Pacific at Camp H.M. Smith.

Col. Nathan Nastase, director of plans and policies for Marine Corps Forces Pacific, said it’s the first time so many nations have been brought together in the Pacific to discuss amphibious operations.

Why Is the US Excluding China from a New Military Meeting?

The idea is to help lay the groundwork for multilateral amphibious exercises between nations further down the line. But as is often the case, much of the attention quickly turned to the one country that was excluded – China.

Yet it would be wrong to interpret any instance where China was not invited to a U.S.-sponsored military engagement as a sign of Washington’s hostility towards Beijing. Firstly, U.S.-China military-to-military relations, in addition to being characterized by deep mistrust and subject to periodic severance, are also significantly circumscribed by law. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, FY2000) specifies 12 operational areas where mil-to-mil contact is prohibited because it is deemed to create a national security risk due to “inappropriate exposure,” and exceptions are granted only to any search and rescue or humanitarian operation or exercise. Therefore, there are strict limits to what the United States can do in terms of including China in military engagements which it does not have with other countries.

Second, and following from this, including China in U.S.-led exercises and engagements has usually been a gradual process that occurs with time and with some necessary adjustments. For example, China’s participation in RIMPAC, which began in 1971, commenced in 2014 and was restricted to certain portions of the exercise like humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as well as search and rescue. Similarly, Beijing’s inclusion in the Cobra Gold exercises in 2014 was as an “observer plus” nation, and it was only invited to participate in the humanitarian and civil assistance (HCA) portion of the exercise which involved activities like building schools. That, of course, does not foreclose the possibility that China may be invited in some capacity further down the line.

Third, it is also not uncommon for the United States to consider whether or not to invite China based on Beijing’s current behavior during that time, rather than as part of a longstanding plot to contain the rising power. Many U.S. policymakers view mil-to-mil relations as not just another realm to cooperate with China, but as a source of leverage to regulate China’s conduct in a way that promotes peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific, particularly since Washington as a lot to offer in this dimension while Beijing often places value in being included in certain engagements. Viewed from that prism, given China’s conduct in the South China Sea and the East China Sea over the past two years alone – from declaring an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea to harassing U.S. and claimant states’ aircraft and ships and carrying out rapid land reclamation activities in the Spratlys – it does not seem like an opportune time to reward Beijing’s behavior by including it in a new engagement.

Fourth and finally, even if there is an opportunity to integrate China into these engagements, there is no obligation for the United States to do so. Despite attempts to cooperate where possible, the United States and China are also competitors with their own interests, and it is neither reasonable to expect them both to include each other in all relevant interactions nor wise to infer that their involvement in such engagements will reduce the friction inherent in U.S.-China relations.

China, it should be noted, is also pursuing exclusive arrangements in the economic domain, though it is yet to develop sufficient military capabilities to do so in the security realm. Given the mix of cooperative and competitive aspects of U.S.-China relations, it would perhaps serve us well if we are prepared for a messy array of military engagements in the Asia-Pacific with varying degrees of inclusiveness – and aware of the limits of U.S.-China mil-to-mil relations – instead of having the same knee-jerk reaction whenever Beijing is not part of a new interaction.

You've read the books, now see the movie

Hopefully, you will have read the Final Reports of GUASA Roundtable 1 (September 2013), and Roundtable 2 (October 2014). These two initial roundtables informed and provided the impetus and basis for a CNAS/GUASA Panel presentation on "The Hill" in Washington, DC, on April 16, 2015. The agenda, including participant bios, for this event was posted here.

Videos of the Keynote addresses, as well as of the two panel presentations, are hosted on YouTube, and embedded below.

Thanks again to the singularly important efforts of Paul S. Giarra and Dr. Patrick Cronin for their conception, creation and coordination of the event, and to the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) whose facilities and staff GUASA has relied on to bring its concerns and message of its efforts to Capital Hill. It would have been only a dream without them, and the support of their colleagues and associates.

And grateful thanks and appreciation to the Keynote Speakers and the panelists for their expert, thoughtful and pertinent remarks and comments, and to Richard Fontaine, President of CNA, for compèring the event.


Keynote Remarks of Representative Madeleine Z. Bordallo, Delegate from the U.S. Territory of Guam





Keynote Remarks of Senator John McCain, Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee






Keynote Remarks of Representative Matthew Salmon, Chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific House Foreign Affairs Committee






Panel 1: Strategic Issues in Maritime Asia

Dr. Patrick M. Cronin, Senior Advisor and Senior Director, Asia-Pacific Security Program
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)

Shawn Brimley, Executive Vice President and Director of Studies
Center for a New American Security

Dr. Ely Ratner, Senior Fellow and Deputy Director, Asia-Pacific Security Program
Center for a New American Security

Bryan McGrath, Deputy Director, Center for American Seapower
Hudson Institute

Dr. Thomas Mahnken, Director of the Advanced Strategy Program
Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies

Panel 2: U.S. Presence, Force Posture, and the Role of the Marianas

Dr. Jerry Hendrix, Senior Fellow and Director, Defense Strategies and Assessments Program
Center for a New American Security

Dr. Thomas Bickford, Asia Analyst, China Studies Division
Center for Naval Analyses

Shirley Kan
Formerly of the Congressional Research Service (CRS)

Paul Giarra, President
Global Strategies & Transformation

Juan Carlos Benitez, Principal
Guam-US-Asia Security Alliance (GUASA)

Call for Pentagon and Congressional leaders to address “growing imbalances within the defense budget"

38 signatories from 15 think tanks and universities, including the American Enterprise Institute, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies have signed an open letter calling for Pentagon and Congressional leaders to address “growing imbalances within the defense budget that threaten the health and viability of America’s military power.”

Citing "strong bipartisan consensus", excerpts from the letter assert:

Too much of the defense budget is currently consumed by institutional inefficiencies, some of which are mandated by law. This is leaving a smaller share of the budget to pay for the manning, training, and equipping of our armed forces that make the US military without peer. Now is the time to begin the hard but necessary work to close excess bases, right-size the civilian workforce, and give future service members more value in a modern pay and benefits package.

As the US military shrinks, it must reduce its inventory of physical infrastructure. Smaller budgets can no longer support paying for the operation of unnecessary facilities. Estimates remain constant that the Pentagon retains over 20 percent excess capacity here in the US. Meanwhile, the military services have arguably drawn down too far in overseas basing. Members of Congress in both parties should partner with the Pentagon to identify the true scale of excess capacity and better match the Department's vast network of facilities to its smaller, more forward-engaged force.

The size and structure of the federal defense civilian workforce is another area in need of urgent examination and restructuring that policymakers in both branches have been reluctant to tackle. From 2001 to 2014, the active duty military shrank by nearly 3 percent. Yet over the same timeframe the number of civilian defense employees grew by 10 percent to 756,000. This workforce rose another 3 percent in just the past year. While these professionals support essential missions of the Defense Department, their growth since 2001 has created a workforce that is now out of proportion to need.

At the same time, the Department of Defense has grown a civilian contractor workforce of nearly the same size, an estimated 700,000.

The Government Accountability Office, for instance, has consistently criticized the Pentagon for failing to collect the necessary data to optimize its workforce-including assessing the most efficient balance between contractors, civilians, and military personnel. Collecting this information is essential in order to bring the defense civilian and contractor workforces into balance with the size of our uniformed military. But the Department should not stop there. In order to right-size the defense workforce, DoD should undertake a systematic effort to de-layer headquarters organizations across the Department, reducing needless bureaucracy and optimizing spans of control to enable better performance at lower cost.

Finally, it is time for a comprehensive modernization of the military compensation system. The nation's approach to military compensation and benefits has changed little since the 1970s, even as the demographics of our force have shifted to a greater proportion of married, college-educated service members with dependents and even as new approaches in areas like health care have created the possibility of delivering better outcomes at lower cost.

In recent years, Pentagon leaders have proposed many incremental changes to military compensation to reduce the rate of growth, but Congress has yet to act in a holistic manner. Congress should, at a minimum, commit to bringing the commission's thoughtful recommendations to a vote in both chambers this year. It should also examine and implement the best proposals for reforming the DoD health care system to deliver better outcomes for service members, retirees, and their families at less cost to the American taxpayer.

Those of us who have joined together in support of these efforts may differ on many issues, but we are unified in our agreement on the need to pursue long-overdue defense and institutional reforms. Excess facilities, an oversized civilian workforce, and outdated military compensation and benefits models all jeopardize the combat power these investments are intended to support.

Again, the letter is available at this link: http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/Defense_letter_april29.pdf


Hattip to CNAS for bringing this to our attention.

Japan, USA tighten alliance

US, Japan Announce Expansion of Defense Ties

The United States and Japan will expand defense ties over cyberspace and regional security threats as they finalize the first revision of security guidelines between the two allies since 1997, defense chiefs from both nations said Wednesday.

The new guidelines would give the allies more flexibility to address regional threats, such as North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs and tensions over territorial integrity; however, specifics on how the new guidelines will be tactically employed remain unclear.

Defense Secretary Ash Carter and Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani also reaffirmed opposition to the use of coercion and force in the East and South China seas, where several nations hold competing claims on island territories. The defense officials also confirmed plans between Japan and the Pentagon to set up a new working group concerning space and cyberspace, Nakatani said.

Carter and Nakatani also discussed the ongoing realignment of U.S. forces in Okinawa, where protesters have escalated demonstrations against the move of a U.S. Marine air field from its urban location in Futenma to Henoko, a rural part of the island.

“We reaffirmed that relocation to Camp Schwab is the only solution to avoid the continued use of Futenma air field,” Nakatani said. The military recently transferred the 128-acre West Futenma housing area to Japan, conducts Osprey missions off-island and still plans to transfer thousands of Marines to Guam to ease the military burden on Okinawa, Carter said Wednesday.

Excerpts of remarks at Abe-Obama joint press conference

Obama: Specifically, we first talked about transforming our security alliance. For the first time in nearly two decades, we’ve updated the guidelines for our defense cooperation. Together, our forces will be more flexible and better prepared to cooperate on a range of challenges.

Our new guidelines complement our effort to realign U.S. forces across the region, including on Okinawa, in order to lessen the impact of our bases on local communities. And I reaffirmed our commitment to move forward with the relocation of Marines from Okinawa to Guam. I want to reiterate that our treaty commitment to Japan’s security is absolute, and that Article 5 covers all territories under Japan’s administration, including Senkaku Islands.

We reviewed the progress our teams have made towards the Trans-Pacific Partnership. I know that Prime Minister Abe, like me, is deeply committed to getting this done, and I’m confident we will.

Abe: Today, we turned a new page in the history of the U.S.-Japan alliance, which exceeds half a century. This is a Japan-U.S. alliance within the context of the world. Japan and the United States are partners who share basic values, such as freedom, democracy, and basic human rights, and the rule of law. The U.S.-Japan alliance characterized by the firmness of its bond is now indispensable to the peace and stability of not only the Asia Pacific but to the world.

We are united in our resoluteness in opposing unilateral attempts to change the status quo in whatever form. Any dispute should be resolved peacefully based on international law and not through coercion or intimidation. Japan welcomes the United States policy of rebalancing, which emphasizes the Asia-Pacific. And President Obama has expressed his support for Japan’s principle of proactive contribution to peace.

We have reaffirmed our resolve to steadily move forward with the realignment of the U.S. forces in Japan. The dangers arising from the Futenma Air Station being surrounded by housing and schools should be eliminated by relocation to Henoko as soon as possible.

We will continue to cooperate to lead the TPP talks through its last phase.

The U.S. Rebalance to Asia: A Status Report

The Center for a New American Security (CNAS) and the Guam-U.S.-Asia Security Alliance (GUASA) cordially invite you to a public, lunch briefing on Capitol Hill on:

The U.S. Rebalance to Asia:

A Status Report

Featuring Keynote Remarks by:

Senator John McCain

Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee

Kelly E. Magsamen

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs

U.S. Department of Defense

**Remarks will be Off-the-Record**

Representative Matthew Salmon

Chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific

House Foreign Affairs Committee

Representative Madeleine Z. Bordallo

Delegate from the U.S. Territory of Guam

Panel Discussions on:

Strategic Issues in Maritime Asia

Dr. Patrick M. Cronin

Senior Advisor and Senior Director, Asia-Pacific Security Program

Center for a New American Security

Shawn Brimley

Executive Vice President and Director of Studies

Center for a New American Security

Dr. Ely Ratner

Senior Fellow and Deputy Director, Asia-Pacific Security Program

Center for a New American Security

Bryan McGrath

Deputy Director, Center for American Seapower

Hudson Institute

Dr. Thomas Mahnken

Director of the Advanced Strategy Program

Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies

U.S. Presence, Force Posture, and the Role of the Marianas

Dr. Jerry Hendrix

Senior Fellow and Director, Defense Strategies and Assessments Program

Center for a New American Security

Dr. Thomas Bickford

Asia Analyst, China Studies Division

Center for Naval Analyses

Shirley Kan

Formerly of the Congressional Research Service (CRS)

Paul Giarra

President of Global Strategies & Transformation

Juan Carlos Benitez

Principal of Guam-US-Asia Security Alliance

12:00 p.m. – 4:00 p.m.

Thursday, April 16, 2015

2172 Rayburn House Office Building

Washington, D.C.

SEE Speaker and panelist bios are below.

Building on the Secretary of Defense’s recent Asia-Pacific tour, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) Asia-Pacific Security Program and the Guam-US-Asia Security Alliance (GUASA) are pleased to announce a special public briefing on U.S. strategy and policy for the Asia-Pacific region. The briefing will provide stand-alone remarks by members of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Congress.

In addition, two panels will offer brief analyses of key strategy, regional force posture, and other relevant issues. The first panel, “Strategic Issues in Maritime Asia,” will cover a breadth of topics including China’s reclamation in the South China Sea, countering maritime coercion, the role of allies and partners, the U.S. Navy’s new report on Chinese maritime power, and the U.S. Department of Defense’s Third Offset Strategy. The second panel, “U.S. Presence, Force Posture, and the Role of the Marianas,” will provide an update on U.S. regional military presence, the strategic purpose of U.S. presence and forces, the role of U.S. territory in engaging allies and partners, and the issues facing the planned buildup in the Marianas.

The panels will also highlight the recently completed CNAS report on cost-imposition strategies in maritime Asia and a newly completed GUASA report on contributions of the Marianas to U.S. rebalance policy.


Tentative Agenda:
12pm Lunch
12:30pm Panel 1: Strategic Issues in Maritime Asia
1:30pm Keynote Remarks by Kelley Magsamen
1:50pm Keynote Remarks by Senator John McCain
2:05pm Keynote Remarks by Representative Matthew Salmon
2:30pm Keynote Remarks by Representative Madeleine Bordallo
2:50pm Panel 2: U.S. Presence, Force Posture, and the Role of the Marianas
3:50pm Closing Remarks


Please join us on Thursday, April 16 from 12 p.m. to 4 p.m. in the Rayburn House Office Building on Capitol Hill. Lunch will be served. Additional speakers may join the program and updates will follow.

RSVP:
Please RSVP to Hannah Suh at hsuh@cnas.org or 202-292-4194.

Dr. Patrick Cronin
Senior Advisor and Senior Director,
Asia-Pacific Security Program
Center for a New American Security

The Center for a New American Security (CNAS) is an independent and nonpartisan research institution that develops strong, pragmatic and principled national security and defense policies. CNAS leads efforts to help inform and prepare the national security leaders of today and tomorrow.

Guam-US-Asia Security Alliance (GUASA) is a Guam-based 501(c)(3) tax-exempt non-profit, non-partisan membership corporation, comprised of people and organizations concerned with the security of all who live in the Western Pacific and along the Pacific Rim.

Speaker and panelist bios:

KELLY E. MAGSAMEN

Kelly Magsamen is the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs with responsibility for defense and security policy in the Asia and Pacific region.  
Prior to joining the Department of Defense, Ms. Magsamen served on the National Security Staff (NSS) in various positions, most immediately as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Strategic Planning on the National Security Staff from 2012-2014.  During her years at NSS, she also served as Director for Iran from 2008-2011, and then as Director and Senior Advisor for Middle East Reform in the wake of the Arab Spring from 2011-2012.

Ms. Magsamen began her government career as a Presidential Management Fellow and civil servant at the State Department, focusing on Iraq assistance issues, and later served as Special Assistant and Chief of Staff to the Counselor to the Department of State, devoting much of her time to Afghanistan policy. In addition to her government experience, she has also worked in private sector consulting, focusing on the Middle East.  Ms. Magsamen received her Bachelors degree in International Relations from American University, and her Masters degree in Strategic Studies from Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.

SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

John McCain entered the Naval Academy in June of 1954. He served in the United States Navy until 1981.  His military honors include the Silver Star, Bronze Star, Legion of Merit, Purple Heart, and the Distinguished Flying Cross. He was first elected to the U.S. House of Representatives from the First District of Arizona in 1982.  After two terms in the House, he was elected to the United States Senate in 1986. He was the Republican Party’s nominee for president in the 2008 election. He currently serves as Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services and also serves on the Senate’s committees for Indian Affairs and Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.

REPRESENTATIVE MATTHEW SALMON

Representative Matt Salmon (AZ-5) graduated from Arizona State University with a bachelor’s degree in English literature and an MPA from Brigham Young University.  In 1990, Mr. Salmon was elected to the Arizona State Senate, where he served from 1991 until 1995.  During this time, he served as Assistant Majority Leader and Chairman of the Rules Committee.  In 1994, Representative Salmon was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives, where he served three terms.  In 2000, he remained faithful to a self-imposed term limit pledge and retired his seat. 

As the only Member of Congress fluent in Mandarin, along with his position on the International Relations Committee, Representative Salmon led multiple U.S. delegations to China, one of

which secured the release of political prisoner Song Yongyi.  After the passage of the Affordable Healthcare Act and the expansion of government regulation during an economic crisis, he again answered the call to serve.  In 2012 and 2014, Arizonans re-elected him to serve in the U.S. House of Representatives.  Representative Salmon was appointed by his peers to serve on the house Committee on Foreign Affairs and serves as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific.  He also serves on the House Committee on Education and the Workforce.

REPRESENTATIVE MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO

A lifetime public servant, in 2003 Congresswoman Madeleine Z. Bordallo became the first woman to represent Guam in the U.S. House of Representatives. Ms. Bordallo brings to Congress over forty years of experience in public service in the executive and legislative branches of
the Government of Guam and numerous non-governmental organizations. The 114th Congress is Ms. Bordallo’s seventh term. Ms. Bordallo will continue to serve on the House Armed Services
Committee and the House Committee on Natural Resources. She was reappointed the Ranking Democrat of the Subcommittee on Readiness in the House Armed Services Committee for the 114th Congress, and is also a member of the Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces.

In the House Committee on Natural Resources, Ms. Bordallo sits on the Subcommittee on Indian, Insular, and Alaskan Affairs as well as the Subcommittee on Water, Power, and Oceans.  In addition to her committee responsibilities, Ms. Bordallo will serve as the vice chair of the Congressional Asian Pacific American Caucus (CAPAC) and the co-chair of the Congressional China Caucus and the Congressional Long Range Strike Caucus.

Congresswoman Bordallo began her public career with local radio and television broadcaster KUAM in 1954. Her involvement in the community has also been extensive, with Bordallo founding the Guam Council of Women's Clubs, the Guam Symphony Society, Y Inetnon Famalao’an (Women for Service), and the Marianas Association for Persons with Disabilities. She was also a past President of the Federation of Asia Pacific Women's Associations (FAWA).

Ms. Bordallo was introduced to public service through her husband Ricky, who served as Governor of Guam from 1975-1978 and 1983-1986. As First Lady, she was a strong advocate of promoting the indigenous Chamorro culture and the arts, both of which are lifelong passions. Between her husband's two terms as governor, Ms. Bordallo became the first woman from the Democratic Party to serve as a Guam Senator. She was a member of the 16th, 19th, 20th, 21st, and 22nd Guam Legislatures. After Governor Bordallo passed away in 1990, Ms. Bordallo decided to continue her husband’s legacy. She ran for governor in 1990 and won the nomination of the Democratic Party. Although she was not successful in 1990, in 1994, Ms. Bordallo teamed up with then-Senator Carl Gutierrez and was elected as Guam’s first woman Lieutenant Governor as part of the Gutierrez-Bordallo gubernatorial ticket. She served two consecutive terms as Lieutenant Governor during which she championed the cause of island beautification as a way to enhance Guam's tourism based economy.

JUAN CARLOS BENITEZ

Juan Carlos Benitez is a Principal on the Conference Team Committee of the Guam-U.S.-Asia Security Alliance (GUASA) and is also an attorney and lobbyist based in Guam.  Mr. Benitez is also known as a key player and fundraiser in the Republican Party and a leader in the Republican Hispanic community.  A native of Puerto Rico and first-hand participant in U.S. territory management, he was formerly the lead U.S. lobbyist for the government of Guam. He served as one of the leading international relations specialists at Cassidy & Associates.  With his depth of knowledge and broad network of contacts, Mr. Benitez has became a tremendous strategic partner for his clients in designing and implementing successful lobbying strategies to further their needs in Washington and Guam. 

Prior to Cassidy, Mr. Benitez served the Bush Administration, as Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair Employment Practices after being nominated by President George W. Bush and confirmed unanimously by the Senate in 2001. As Special Counsel, Mr. Benitez was the highest-ranking Hispanic presidential appointee at the Justice Department. Mr. Benitez also practiced governmental affairs as Of Counsel to the law firm of Long Aldridge and Norman, where he was part of the Immigration and Labor practice group as well as an integral member of the Government Affair practice group. As Legislative Director for the Office of the Governor of Puerto Rico, Mr. Benitez was responsible for the development and implementation of Puerto Rico's congressional and executive lobbying strategy.  Mr. Benitez was also the representative for the Governor before U.S. Congress and all U.S. federal government agencies. Thanks to Mr. Benitez's leadership the Government of Puerto Rico was able to increase the amount of Federal funds it received from Congress to the highest amount it had ever received.

DR. THOMAS BICKFORD

Thomas J. Bickford, Ph.D. is an Asia analyst in CNA's China Security Affairs Group. At CNA, his research has focused on Chinese maritime strategy, Chinese national security policy, and China’s relations with its neighbors. His previous work includes several articles and book chapters on Chinese civil-military relations, professional military education, and internal security.

Before joining CNA, he was an associate professor at the University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh, where he taught international relations and Chinese politics. He was also an associate director of the Wisconsin Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies.

Bickford holds a Ph.D. in political science from the University of California, Berkeley, an M.S. in international studies from the London School of Economics, and a B.A. in East Asian studies from the University of Chicago. He has also studied in Taiwan and Hong Kong and has conducted extensive field research in China.

SHAWN BRIMLEY

Shawn Brimley is Executive Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) where he oversees the center’s research and serves on the executive leadership team. Mr. Brimley rejoined CNAS after serving in the Obama Administration from February 2009 to October 2012 most recently as Director for Strategic Planning on the National Security Council staff at the White House. He also served as Special Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy at the Pentagon from 2009 to 2011, where he focused on the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, overseas basing and posture, and long-range strategy development. In 2012, he was awarded the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service and in 2010 he was awarded the Officer of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Public Service.

Mr. Brimley was a founding member of CNAS in 2007 and was the inaugural recipient of the 1Lt. Andrew Bacevich Jr. Memorial Fellowship. He has also worked at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Mr. Brimley has been published in a variety of venues, including the New York Times, Foreign Affairs and Foreign Policy. Educated at Queen’s University and George Washington University, his research interests include U.S. national security strategy and defense policy, the impact of emerging technology on U.S. strategic choices, and the evolution of America’s global diplomatic and defense posture. Mr. Brimley is a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations. He lives in Washington with his wife Marjorie and their two children.

DR. PATRICK CRONIN

Patrick M. Cronin is a Senior Advisor and Senior Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). Previously, he was the Senior Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University, where he simultaneously oversaw the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs.

Dr. Cronin has a rich and diverse background in both Asian-Pacific security and U.S. defense, foreign and development policy.  Prior to leading INSS, Dr. Cronin served as the Director of  Studies at the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).  At the IISS, he also served as Editor of the Adelphi Papers and as the Executive Director of the Armed Conflict Database.  Before joining IISS, Dr. Cronin was Senior Vice President and Director of Research at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

In 2001, Dr. Cronin was confirmed by the United States Senate to the third-ranking position at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).  While serving as Assistant Administrator for Policy and Program Coordination, Dr. Cronin also led the interagency task force that helped design the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC).

From 1998 until 2001, Dr. Cronin served as Director of Research at the U.S. Institute of Peace. Prior to that, he spent seven years at the National Defense University, first arriving at INSS in 1990 as a Senior Research Professor covering Asian and long-range security issues.  He was the founding Executive Editor of Joint Force Quarterly, and subsequently became both Deputy Director and Director of Research at the Institute.  He received the Army's Meritorious Civilian Service Award upon his departure from NDU in 1997.

He has also been a senior analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, a U.S. Naval Reserve Intelligence officer, and an analyst with the Congressional Research Service and SRI International.  He was Associate Editor of Strategic Review and worked as an undergraduate at the Miami Herald and the Fort Lauderdale News.

Dr. Cronin has taught at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program, The Johns Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), and the University of Virginia’s Woodrow Wilson Department of Government.

PAUL GIARRA

Paul Giarra leads Global Strategies & Transformation, a national defense and strategic planning consultancy. He is a thought leader, a proven strategic planner, and a creative concept developer who combines substance with process. His in-depth analysis and national level strategic policy formulation; broad historical knowledge of global regions and current security politics; extensive international expertise and reputation; and technical knowledge of change mechanisms, security futures, and defense transformation underpin his extensive wargaming, writing for publication, creative development of plausible future scenarios, and concept development and experimentation. A natural collaborator and team leader, he maintains especially broad contacts throughout the security thought leadership community, in the Regional Combatant Commands, in Asia, and in NATO. He also is a qualified and experienced program manager of significant projects and staffs.
 

DR. JERRY HENDRIX

Jerry Hendrix is a Senior Fellow and the Director of the Defense Strategies and Assessments Program at the Center for a New American Security.

A retired Captain in the United States Navy, his staff assignments include tours with the Chief of Naval Operation’s Executive Panel (N00K), where his efforts centered on Homeland Defense, Naval Aviation, and Navy Missile Defense, the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (Force Development) where he served as Executive Secretary for the Irregular Warfare Quadrennial Defense Review cell, and the OSD Office of Net Assessment where he assisted the Director on topics related to forecasting future capabilities and alternative security environments.  From 2011-2012 he served as the Director and Designated Federal Officer of the Secretary of the Navy’s Advisory Panel.  In this position he assisted the Advisory Panel in their deliberations on the Department’s energy policy and its approach to the Asia Pacific region.  He also contributed to the 2012 Department Posture Statement to the Congress.  Following the fall, 2011 Navy Inspector General’s Report on the state of the Naval History and Heritage Command, he was verbally ordered by the Secretary to assume the position of Director of Naval History.

Hendrix previously served as the Navy Fellow to the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University where he focused on the use of naval power as an instrument of coercive diplomacy.  He has been awarded a Bachelor Degree in Political Science from Purdue University, Masters Degrees from the Naval Postgraduate School (National Security Affairs) and Harvard University (History) and received his doctorate from King’s College, London (War Studies).   His awards include two Legion of Merit awards, and the Defense Superior Service Medal.  He has twice been named the Samuel Eliot Morison Scholar by the Navy Historical Center in Washington, DC, and was also the Center’s 2005 Rear Admiral John D. Hays Fellow. He also held the Marine Corps’ General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. Fellowship. He authored the book Theodore Roosevelt’s Naval Diplomacy and received a number of awards, including the United States Naval Institute’s Author of the Year and the Navy League’s Alfred T. Mahan Award for Literary Achievement.

SHIRLEY KAN

Shirley Kan was a Specialist in Asian Security Affairs in the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division with the Congressional Research Service (CRS), a non-partisan agency of the U.S. Congress.  At CRS from 1990 to 2015, Shirley Kan wrote policy analysis and provided other non-partisan legislative support to Congress as a Specialist in Asian Security Affairs.  She has specialized in national security interests in U.S. policies concerning the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and concerning Taiwan. 
 

Kan's writings discuss policy concerns that include the challenges of weapons nonproliferation, counter-terrorism, military-to-military contacts, the PLA’s modernization and missile buildup, U.S. security assistance for Taiwan’s self-defense, the “one China” policy for supporting U.S. interests in the Taiwan Strait, and the defense buildup on Guam.  Ms. Kan participated in the Army War College’s Commandant’s National Security Program in July 2012.  During the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-1996, she directly supported the Defense Attaché at the Embassy in Beijing, for which she received a Department of Defense Special Achievement Award.  During the summer of 1989 at the Consulate-General in Shenyang, she reported on the pro-democracy movement and political-military crisis in the PRC while serving as the Political Intern.  Ms. Kan graduated cum laude from the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University in Washington, DC, with a Bachelor of Science in Foreign Service in 1988 and from the graduate school of the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor in 1990. 

DR. THOMAS MAHNKEN

Thomas G. Mahnken is a Senior Research Professor and the Director of the Advanced Strategy Program at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies, as well as the Jerome E. Levy Chair of Economic Geography and National Security at the U.S. Naval War College. From 2006 to 2009, he served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning. Between 1997 and 2006, he served as a Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College. From 2004 to 2006 he was a Visiting Fellow at the Merrill Center at SAIS. During the 2003-04 academic year he served as the Acting Director of the SAIS Strategic Studies Program.

He is currently serving on the staff of the Congressionally-mandated National Defense Panel and served on the staff of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, in the Defense Department’s Office of Net Assessment, and as a member of the Gulf War Air Power Survey. His most recent books are Strategic Studies: A Reader (Routledge, 2014) and Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century: Theory, History, and Practice (Stanford University Press, 2012). He holds a MA and Ph.D. in international affairs from SAIS and BA degrees in history and international relations (with highest honors) from the University of Southern California. He is a Commander in the U.S. Navy Reserve and a recipient of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service.

BRYAN MCGRATH

Bryan McGrath is the founding Managing Director of The FerryBridge Group LLC (FBG), a niche consultancy specializing in naval and national security issues, including national and military strategy, strategic planning, executive communications, strategic communications and emerging technologies.  He is also the Deputy Director of the Center for American Seapower at the Hudson Institute.

Prior to starting FBG, Bryan founded a national security consulting line of business for Delex Systems of Herndon, VA, where he directly supported a number of senior clients in the Navy and the Army.  Additionally, he provided critical insight on Navy policy and acquisition preferences to commercial clients, including major defense contractors and small technology firms negotiating the "post-earmarks" era.   

A retired Naval Officer, Bryan spent 21 years on active duty including a tour in command of USS BULKELEY (DDG 84), a guided-missile destroyer homeported in Norfolk, Virginia.  In command, he received the "Admiral Elmo Zumwalt Award for Inspirational Leadership" from the Surface Navy Association and his ship earned the USS ARIZONA Memorial Trophy signifying its selection as the Fleet's most combat-ready warship.  His final duties ashore included serving as Team Lead and Primary Author of the US Navy's 2007 Maritime Strategy A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.

Bryan earned a BA in History from the University of Virginia in 1987, and an MA in Political Science (Congressional Studies) from The Catholic University of America. He is a graduate of the Naval War College.

DR. ELY RATNER

Dr. Ely Ratner is Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). Prior to joining CNAS he served on the China Desk at the State Department as the lead political officer covering China’s external relations in Asia. He has also worked as an Associate Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation and as a Professional Staff Member on the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Dr. Ratner has testified as an expert witness on Asian security affairs before the U.S. Congress and the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. His commentary and research have appeared in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, The Washington Post, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Quarterly, The National Interest, Journal of Conflict Resolution, International Studies Quarterly and Chinese Journal of International Politics, among others. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley and his B.A. from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, where he graduated Magna Cum Laude and Phi Beta Kappa. 

Announcing publication of the Final Report of the 2014 GUASA Roundtable

The GUASA Roundtable 2, Asia Pacific Security: Regional Commons, Sovereign Interests, successfully concluded October 17, 2014 at the Nikko Hotel Guam on Tumon Bay. The video and audio has been reviewed and transcribed, and at last the Final Report has been pieced together by participating experts Timothy A. Walton and Paul S. Giarra.   GUASA is grateful to them and other participants, including Bob Mihalik and Dr. Patrick Cronin, for their long hours and hard labor to bring this Final Report to fruition. 

GUASA especially mentions the critical contribution and sponsorship of Docomo Pacific for providing the recording and transcription services that made this report possible.

The Final Report of GUASA Roundtable 2, entitled "The Rebalance at a Critical Point", after the Keynote Address of the same title given by Honorable Guam Congresswoman Madeleine Z. Bodallo, contains the substance of the first ever conversation of Pacific Asia security experts, hosted and held on neighboring sovereign American soil in Asia, on the Asian side of the International Date Line, in the middle of the Western Pacific Ocean. Participating experts came from the Republic of Korea, the Republic of China (Taiwan), the Republic of Vietnam, the Republic of the Philippines, Malayasia, Australia, Japan and the United States of America.

It is GUASA's intent that this will not be the last time America hosts and meets its neighbors in Asia, on its home ground.  As a senior Japanese expert commented, "I wish I had known more about Guam ten years ago, as I would have encouraged more alliance cooperation centered on Guam."

The 2014 GUASA Roundtable 2 Final Report (pdf) is available for download at this link.

A milestone in the evolution of the US-Japan Alliance

Dr. Patrick M. Cronin is Senior Advisor and Senior Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. He was a Keynote Speaker and panelist for GUASA's 2013 Roundtable, and an organizer and panelist for GUASA's 2014 Roundtable. He is the author of the following article appearing in The National Interest online magazine, and has authored many other articles for that publication. Please read the whole article at the link; excerpts are related below.

A New Type of U.S.-Japan Relations

At 9:30 AM on April 28, 1952 the U.S.-Japan alliance stood up as the U.S. occupation of Japan stood down [4]. At the end of this month, the U.S.-Japan alliance will step up as Japan steps out as a more normal state, capable of both defending itself and others.

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s address to a joint session of Congress on April 29 should go down in history as a day of glory, not of infamy. Some serious critics will remain dissatisfied over perceived historical revisionism. Yet the fact will remain that the biggest antagonists in the Pacific War have forged a prosperous postwar system and a vigorous alliance. When the Prime Minister speaks to a full house of Senators and Representatives, he can be expected to offer humble remorse for the past, quiet pride in Japan’s remarkable seven-decade-long contribution to global order, and a roadmap for how the alliance can perpetuate a rules-based system well into the 21st century.

The latest evolution of the alliance will be encapsulated in new defense guidelines issued on the eve of the oration, which will be delivered in English. To be sure, the guidelines document itself will be unremarkable. Twenty-five pages of prose written by a bureaucratic committee describing allied roles and missions are not meant to be Shakespearean. Those seeking a coherent statement of strategic clarity will also be disappointed. Nonetheless, the guidelines will provide a gateway to an unprecedented degree of alliance capacity, comprehensiveness, and coordination.

In short, the new guidelines will mark a milestone along the path of converting a relationship between a victor and the vanquished into a mature security partnership between the world’s two richest democracies, capable of acting swiftly and in concert to address a full array of contingencies, from humanitarian disaster to war.

Although Japan surrendered to the United States on September 2, 1945, peace between the former foes did not become official until April 28, 1952, when the San Francisco Peace Treaty [6] signed the previous September took effect. This original alliance agreement was necessarily provisional, recognizing that Japan had been disarmed and was therefore incapable of exercising effective right of self-defense.

Eight years alter, the 1960 U.S.-Japan treaty (formally, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America took into account a more equal partnership, albeit one in which the division of labor was complimentary but utterly different (viz., Japanese bases for American defense).

The 1960 treaty is a model of concision and can be summarized in a single paragraph. The allies pledge to uphold the United Nations Charter, to settle international disputes peacefully, and to refrain from “the use of force against the territorial integrity of political independence of any state.” Both vow to strengthen “free institutions” and promote “stability and well-being.” “By means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid [the allies] will maintain and develop…their capacities to resist armed attack.” They will consult regularly “whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.” The treaty’s famous Article V clause stipulates that each “recognizes that an armed attack…in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous…and declares that it would act to meet the common danger….” Finally, U.S. forces would gain access to land, air, and naval bases, the terms of which would be governed by a separate agreement.

The alliance framework has held up all these decades, but periodic guidelines have been drafted to help define the roles and missions of the two allies.

Yet the guidelines are more about enabling operational capability, not strategy. Even so, it is possible to see both continuity and change in the third set of guidelines to be issued at a 2+2 meeting just before the summit meeting between President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Abe in late April.

The main points of continuity are likely to be that the defense of Japan remains at the core of the alliance. Japan under Abe is not looking for conflict but rather grasping for more security in light of a rapidly changing security environment. The United States, for its part, wants to reassure Japan as to its security, as a means to preserving and adapting a stable and prosperous region. In addition, Japan will remain committed to a basically defensive posture as well as its three non-nuclear principles of not possessing, not producing, and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons on its soil.

But while the fundamentals remain unchanged, the scope and depth of the alliance’s operational capacity will enter a new era. A common operational system will be established with new technology backed up by political understanding. The technology involves interoperable and state-of-the-art command, control, communications and computers and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. The political dimension emerges from the lesson of the 1997 guidelines. A bilateral coordination mechanism to deal with a crisis was never enacted in part because of the potentially escalatory signal it might send to other actors such as North Korea.

The new guidelines will make a common operational coordination system part of the daily regimen. This is essential for dealing with the ongoing grey zone challenges around the Senkaku Islands (which the Chinese call the Diaoyu Islands). But the bilateral coordination mechanism is also meant to be allow “seamless” operations whether the alliance if facing another 3/11 disaster, a 9/11-type major terror attack, or military conflict in the East China Sea or over North Korea. That should ease the ability to pivot from a homeland security to a national security crisis to a whole-of-government or even whole-of-society response.

Another crucial change in these guidelines is the provision that will set in motion further growth in cooperation over how to deal with challenges in cyber and outer space. More questions than answers remain in these areas, including what kind of response would be triggered if one ally or the other found its computer networks or satellites under attack. But by underlining the mounting significance of these domains, the allies signal their determination to make defense cooperation in these areas a high priority in the years ahead.

Of course a common strategy and common interests are necessary but insufficient bases for preserving an effective alliance. Alliances also take constant attention to produce value. This is why some have likened alliance management to gardening. The new guidelines mark a sea change in alliance intent and organization, but they will only be as successful as the day-to-day follow through. This includes, in Japan, following through on the critical legal basis for Japan’s proactive policies. At this juncture, by the end of the summer the Diet seems likely to pass the dozen or so pieces of law necessary to put teeth into the Prime Minister’s plan. That will allow Japan the legal right of collective-self defense, at least under specified conditions, as well as more expansive alliance integration—for instance, the right of the Maritime Self Defense Force to conduct joint patrols out to the South China Sea. In the United States, it means not just using the bilateral coordination mechanism to play point defense on territorial disputes, but using it as a basis to catalyze wider and deeper strategic discussion. It also means working to bring new actors to the table of alliance discussions, from coast guard and law enforcement to those with interests and responsibilities in cyber and outer space.

Meanwhile, as we have seen during the previous nearly-two-decade-long periods between previous sets of guidelines, the world and regional security landscape will not stand still. The process of adapting to emerging challenges is a constant imperative. Nonetheless, the ascent and trajectory of the alliance from April 28, 1952 to that of April 28, 2015 is nothing short of astonishing.

China aid to Pacific Island nations

China has become a 'major donor' in the Pacific Islands region

China is on track to overtake Japan as the third largest donor to Pacific Island nations. In some countries, Chinese aid amounts are already rivaling that of traditional partners, as analyst Philippa Brant tells DW. China has also held two main regional meetings (2006 and 2013) in which it announced a range of aid measures to strengthen economic development and diplomatic engagement with the region. Beijing also provides support to key regional organizations, particularly the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. In addition to its bilateral aid program and support for regional organizations, China also provides scholarships for Pacific Islands students and significant human resources training for government officials, according to the Sydney-based institute.

But new data published by the Lowy Institute on March 2, reveal that since 2006 China has provided $1.4 billion in foreign aid to eight Pacific Island countries - the Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Fiji, Niue, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu. China aid researcher Dr Philippa Brant put together data from over 500 sources, including budgets, tender documents and government statements to come up with an interactive map which gives a detailed picture of China's aid to eight Pacific Island countries.

In a DW interview, Dr Brant talks about China's aims in the region, the risks involved in these financial commitments and which countries have profited most from Chinese aid thus far. Dr Philippa Brant is a Research Associate working with the Research Director of the Australia-based Lowy Institute for International Policy.

Many countries in the Pacific Islands region have significant development challenges, ranging from healthcare to infrastructure to climate change. Although countries receive substantial assistance from traditional partners like Australia and New Zealand, there has been a need for further assistance, particularly in the infrastructure sector.

China, like all countries, provides aid for a number of reasons: economic, diplomatic, and political. In the Pacific Islands region, China is hoping that its assistance will help demonstrate that it is a responsible power that supports other developing countries.

Concessional loans have become a dominant feature of China's aid to the Pacific since 2006, accounting for almost 80 percent of the total aid provided. Many of these loans have been used to build infrastructure, such as roads and hospitals. At the second China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum, held in Guangzhou in 2013, China pledged $1 billion in concessional loans (plus another $1 billion in commercial loans from China Development Bank).

Papua New Guinea and Fiji have received the most aid from China since 2006. This makes sense, as they are the two largest economies in the region. However, China has also provided substantial support to smaller countries, like Vanuatu and Samoa.

See Lowy Institutes's A new tool to examine Chinese aid in the Pacific

Similar stories:

China's aid to Pacific nations since 2006 - $2b

China increases its aid contribution to Pacific Island nations

China Boosting Aid to South Pacific

And see: Western powers coming to terms with China in the Pacific 2 March 2015

In the last decade, China's rapid growth has found it eager to spread its influence in a number of regions around the world, including the Pacific. There are economic and security reasons for this, but also, China says, because it wants to help smaller countries. China has recently announced a billion US dollar loan facility available to Pacific Island countries in the next few years.

A conference held this week at the National University of Samoa, 'China and the Pacific: The View from Oceania', sought to counter misperceptions about China's role in the region, particularly its aid programme.

Organised by Victoria University's Contemporary China Research Centre in conjunction with the Centre for Oceania Studies at China's Sun Yat-sen University and Samoa's University, the conference pulled together a wide range of scholars and policy makers including rarely-heard Chinese voices on the issue. China's Ambassador to Samoa, Madame Li Yanduan, says China takes its role as a leading member of the global community seriously.

MADAME LI YANDUAN: It is our belief that common development is good for the interests of China and also the rest of the developing countries, so that's why we think the Pacific Island countries are important and we would like to contribute something to the development of this region.

Pacific island governments are indicating that China is often more responsive to their needs. Paul D'Arcy, from the Australian National University's College of Asia and the Pacific, says at the same time, Island leaders have learnt how to seek out beneficial aid partnerships.

PAUL D'ARCY: What we are now seeing is the nature of Chinese aid, is that we get Chinese entrepreneurs or Chinese companies coming and saying what do you want? Because they have to go sell that then to Chinese state banks and so it's very much more so a partnership at a ground level getting these aid programmes going.

The director of the University of Hawaii's Centre for Pacific Studies, Terence Wesley-Smith, says China's foray into the Pacific is the biggest challenge yet to the influence in the region of the traditional external powers, Australia, New Zealand and the United States.

TERENCE WESLEY-SMITH: It's not a military challenge, it's a challenge to a sort of regime of aid and support that's been developed over many decades and it's a regime of support which comes with an agenda.

Professor Wesley-Smith says for instance Australia's aid to the islands is often tied to conditions around political and governance reform and neo-liberal economic opportunities.

TERENCE WESLEY-SMITH: To this point there's sort of been a monopoly of aid donors who are agreed that these are the conditions and that monopoly has now effectively been broken by the emergency of China as an alternative aid donor which offers support without political conditions and from the islands' perspective, I think most Pacific leaders, at least, welcome this because it offers them new opportunities that they didn't have before -- new trading partners, new possible sources of investment, and possibilities of working with powers other than traditional external powers.

Samoa's Prime Minister Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi says China's aid in the region fills certain gaps.

TUILAEPA SAILELE MALIELEGAOI: The problem of course is that different countries, development partners of the region, have different priorities, and that's why I mention that China comes in as providing supplementary resources available to the region, covering those areas which are not covered in traditional aid donors' programmes.

Professor Liu Hongzhong of the Centre for Oceanian Studies at Peking University says some western countries are not used to seeing China's aid efforts in the region.

LIU HONGZHONG: Of course China has a big population and people will have doubts about the motives and whether they're going to take the lead or change the rules or whatever. So why don't we just take China as another traditional member of the donors. If New Zealand or Australia were going to donate, would anyone have doubts about their motives?

A number of delegates at the Samoa conference were at pains to point out that there is room for a wide range of partners in the Pacific region. Ambassador Li says China is not looking to usurp other donor countries, but to work together.

MADAME LI YANDUAN: We think the diplomatic corp, we think it's quite open and people just exchange the information about the assistance, development, land - something like that.

China is now showing that it is increasingly flexible and learning more about aid delivery by working with other donor countries in the Pacific, such as with Australia on malaria prevention in Papua New Guinea, and with New Zealand on a tripartite water project in the Cook Islands.