24 nations to take part in Marine Corps Forces Pacific's 'Amphibious Leaders' symposium
Marine Corps Forces Pacific is hosting 23 foreign nations at the inaugural U.S. Pacific Command Amphibious Leaders Symposium May 17 to 21 in Hawaii. Senior military leaders of allied and partner nations are expected to attend.Why Is the US Excluding China from a New Military Meeting?
Australia, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Columbia, France, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Maldives, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Tonga, United Kingdom and Vietnam will be sending representatives, the Marines said. India, Brazil and East Timor were invited but not able to attend.
Growing Indo-Asia-Pacific economics and rising tensions have placed the littorals, where a majority of shipping and commerce operates, at the center of the bullseye for the U.S. military pivot to the Pacific.
“We have thousands and thousands of miles of coastline, thousands and thousands of islands, interposing water between it, and everybody who wants to use that water as maneuver space,” said Brig. Gen. C. J. Mahoney, deputy commander of Marine Corps Forces Pacific at Camp H.M. Smith.
Col. Nathan Nastase, director of plans and policies for Marine Corps Forces Pacific, said it’s the first time so many nations have been brought together in the Pacific to discuss amphibious operations.
The idea is to help lay the groundwork for multilateral amphibious exercises between nations further down the line. But as is often the case, much of the attention quickly turned to the one country that was excluded – China.
Yet it would be wrong to interpret any instance where China was not invited to a U.S.-sponsored military engagement as a sign of Washington’s hostility towards Beijing. Firstly, U.S.-China military-to-military relations, in addition to being characterized by deep mistrust and subject to periodic severance, are also significantly circumscribed by law. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, FY2000) specifies 12 operational areas where mil-to-mil contact is prohibited because it is deemed to create a national security risk due to “inappropriate exposure,” and exceptions are granted only to any search and rescue or humanitarian operation or exercise. Therefore, there are strict limits to what the United States can do in terms of including China in military engagements which it does not have with other countries.
Second, and following from this, including China in U.S.-led exercises and engagements has usually been a gradual process that occurs with time and with some necessary adjustments. For example, China’s participation in RIMPAC, which began in 1971, commenced in 2014 and was restricted to certain portions of the exercise like humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as well as search and rescue. Similarly, Beijing’s inclusion in the Cobra Gold exercises in 2014 was as an “observer plus” nation, and it was only invited to participate in the humanitarian and civil assistance (HCA) portion of the exercise which involved activities like building schools. That, of course, does not foreclose the possibility that China may be invited in some capacity further down the line.
Third, it is also not uncommon for the United States to consider whether or not to invite China based on Beijing’s current behavior during that time, rather than as part of a longstanding plot to contain the rising power. Many U.S. policymakers view mil-to-mil relations as not just another realm to cooperate with China, but as a source of leverage to regulate China’s conduct in a way that promotes peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific, particularly since Washington as a lot to offer in this dimension while Beijing often places value in being included in certain engagements. Viewed from that prism, given China’s conduct in the South China Sea and the East China Sea over the past two years alone – from declaring an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea to harassing U.S. and claimant states’ aircraft and ships and carrying out rapid land reclamation activities in the Spratlys – it does not seem like an opportune time to reward Beijing’s behavior by including it in a new engagement.
Fourth and finally, even if there is an opportunity to integrate China into these engagements, there is no obligation for the United States to do so. Despite attempts to cooperate where possible, the United States and China are also competitors with their own interests, and it is neither reasonable to expect them both to include each other in all relevant interactions nor wise to infer that their involvement in such engagements will reduce the friction inherent in U.S.-China relations.
China, it should be noted, is also pursuing exclusive arrangements in the economic domain, though it is yet to develop sufficient military capabilities to do so in the security realm. Given the mix of cooperative and competitive aspects of U.S.-China relations, it would perhaps serve us well if we are prepared for a messy array of military engagements in the Asia-Pacific with varying degrees of inclusiveness – and aware of the limits of U.S.-China mil-to-mil relations – instead of having the same knee-jerk reaction whenever Beijing is not part of a new interaction.
